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Introduction 
 
A distinctive feature of the contemporary period of globalization is a powerful trend towards 
marketization in many regions of the world. The term “marketization” refers both to market 
ideologies and market-oriented reforms. A market ideology reflects the belief that markets are 
of superior efficiency for the allocation of goods and resources. In its most extreme form, this 
belief is associated with the commodification of nearly all spheres of human life. Market-
oriented reforms are those policies fostering the emergence and development of markets and 
weakening, in parallel, alternative institutional arrangements. During the last decades of the 
twentieth century, the dominant market-oriented reform mix has included macroeconomic 
stabilization, privatization, deregulation, liberalization of foreign trade and liberalization of 
international capital flows (Simmons et al. 2003).  
 
Since the early 1980s, market ideology and market-oriented policies have spread fast and 
wide around the globe. Markets, the argument goes, are better at allocating resources and 
producing wealth than bureaucracies, cartels or governments. Furthermore, the global 
diffusion of marketization has had an impact well beyond the traditional boundaries of the 
economy. Marketization implies a redefinition of economic rules of the game but also a 
transformed perspective on states, regulation and their role. Marketization is questioning all 
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forms of protective boundaries and barriers and having an impact, as a consequence, on social 
but also cultural and legal policies (Collectif Dalloz 2004; Thornton 2004).  
 
As defined here, the marketization process points to a number of issues. There is first the 
issue of origins. To understand the genealogy of contemporary marketization, we have to go 
back to the liberal inspiration.1
 
 We also have to consider the alternative ideological frames 
historically available. We do both in the first section of this chapter. A second issue is that of 
ideological sustainability. For a large part of the twentieth century, the liberal inspiration has 
been marginalized, both in intellectual and policy making terms. Beyond the “sleeping 
beauty”, we identify in section 2 the nodes where the liberal flame was kept alive. Such 
intellectual “night watch” proved essential to the liberal revival that started in the 1970s. In 
section 3, we describe the unique intellectual and institutional conditions of that revival.  
 
In section 4, we turn to the issue of global diffusion. Why and how have market-oriented 
reforms and ideas become so widespread during the last two decades of the twentieth century? 
There are essentially two ways to account for ideological and policy parallelism. The first is 
through “modernization” arguments. Markets emerge everywhere in a parallel and 
independent manner simply because they are most efficient (Friedman 2000; Lal 2000). A 
second way to explain convergence is through diffusionist arguments. Structures and practices 
tend to resemble each other due to the density of channels stimulating processes of transfer 
and diffusion (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Strang and Meyer 1993; Djelic 1998; Scott 2003). 
We set ourselves within that second perspective and hence look at the conditions, carriers and 
mechanisms behind the diffusion of market ideas and policies.  
                                                 
1 Throughout this chapter, “liberal” will be understood in the European sense of the term.  
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Finally, the impact and consequences of the progress of marketization is another important 
issue. Marketization is transforming economic institutions in many countries while also 
reflecting upon social, political and cultural arrangements. We approach this issue in the 
conclusion and briefly point at the same time to the limits of the marketization trend.  
 
 
Intellectual Roots and Alternatives  
 
Trying to identify the precise intellectual origins of a system of thought is a thankless task. 
Let us start, however, from the widely shared assumption that Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, originally published in 1776, was a defining 
work for liberalism. This book played a key role in the emergence of the modern science of 
economics and was of particular influence in the stream of economics that has glorified the 
market (Stigler 1976; Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001).2
The Liberal Inspiration 
 The work of Adam Smith set itself in the 
continuity of political liberalism while strongly arguing against mercantilism and its 
proponents (Heckscher 1962; Schumpeter 1983: I, vii). 
 
Adam Smith was expanding upon the contributions of the great founders of political 
liberalism – John Locke in particular. For Locke, a state of nature predated the social contract. 
In that pre-social state, each individual was facing nature and interactions between individuals 
turned around that interface. They had to do with work, the products of work and property 
                                                 
2 This influence is undeniable even though the historiography points to incompatibilities between parts of 
Smith’s work and the most extreme forms of neo-liberal argument (Viner 1960). 
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rights. Pre-political – ‘natural’ – man was therefore a homo economicus (Manent 1986; Locke 
1997). The social and political contract emerged only in reaction to threats and to generate 
collective responsibility for the respect of natural law and the protection of private property. 
Building upon the idea of “natural man” as economic man, Adam Smith re-affirmed both the 
autonomy of the economic sphere and its historical and moral precedence over other spheres 
of human life (Smith 1999). Adam Smith also took over the idea that the economic sphere 
was by nature stable, structured by “natural laws” – essentially the propensity to barter and 
the division of labor, competition and the Invisible Hand of the market.  
 
Economic man had, according to Adam Smith, a natural propensity to “truck, barter and 
exchange one thing for another” (Smith 1999: I, ii, 117). The market, from this perspective, 
was a natural and essential dimension of social life. Each individual could obtain what she 
needed on the market in exchange for the things she produced. The extent and complexity of 
the division of labour depended upon the scale and density of the market, itself in direct 
correlation with demographic and infrastructural conditions (Smith 1999: I, iii). Adam Smith 
argued that the progressive extension and expansion of markets meant, ultimately, not only 
greater individual and collective well being but also moral, social and political progress away 
from feudalism and tyranny and towards yeomanry and democracy (Smith 1999: I, i, 109; III).  
 
Another “natural law”, according to Adam Smith, was that markets were orderly. Order did 
not stem from an all-powerful regulator but from a multiplicity of transactions and their 
combination (Smith 1999: I, ii, 119). Through combination in the market, the greed and 
selfishness of individual acts turned into a morally satisfying and welfare maximizing 
collective order. In The Wealth of Nations, individuals were pictured as a-moral; the market, 
though, was inherently albeit mysteriously producing a progressive and moral order (Nelson 
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2001). The miracle of the Invisible Hand required, however, specific conditions and in 
particular that markets function freely. Smith pointed to two types of obstacles. Market 
players themselves could introduce disruption and “people of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against 
the public or in some contrivance to raise prices” (Smith 1999: I, x, 232). This part of Smith’s 
argument has often been neglected but it shows deep consciousness that competitive markets 
were not automatically self-sustaining. Smith also strongly denounced tampering and 
intervention by political authorities (Smith 2000: IV, ii). That particular denunciation is an 
important part of the genetic link between Smith’s liberalism and contemporary neoliberalism 
(Skinner 1999: 79).  
 
Mercantilism and German Historicism as Intellectual Alternatives  
The idea is naturally not to reduce the history of economic thought to an opposition between 
liberalism, mercantilism and German historicism. Still, identities are also constituted in part 
through opposition and conflict. In 1776, Smith was championing political liberalism but he 
was also opposing and arguing against mercantilism. And later on, at an important moment 
for economics, during the early years of professionalization, the debate between classical 
liberalism and historicism proved potent (Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). In contrast to the 
communist alternatives that flourished during the 19th century, those three intellectual 
traditions were compatible with capitalism and private property. They revealed, however, 
different conceptions of the nature and role of markets. 
 
Mercantilism 
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More than a theory, mercantilism is a label that gained visibility and coherence through the 
violent attacks of liberal economists – and of Adam Smith in particular (Heckster 1962; 
Magnusson 1994). 
 
Mercantilists claimed that the wealth of a country was measured by its stock of precious 
metals. Hence a nation should control imports and exports to maximize that stock. This 
concretely meant an endorsement of political intervention in economic affairs. Political 
intervention could go in different directions. States could impose tariffs to control imports but 
also to protect national industries and give them time to develop. State intervention could 
mean aggressive political support of exports – including through military imperialism or 
colonialism. States could encourage the multiplication of manufactures, by providing capital 
or granting privileges such as exclusivity over a market or even by themselves turning 
entrepreneurs.  
 
For mercantilist writers, the economy was serving a wider national project. Polity and 
economy were tightly intertwined and political aims had the pre-eminent role. Ultimately, 
foreign trade was not so different from a (peaceful) game of war and all national forces should 
be mobilized to wage that war. The state had a privileged understanding of national needs, 
national resources and their articulation. Hence, it should actively intervene, fixing priorities, 
combining individual efforts and controlling results. From a mercantilist perspective, reliance 
on private initiative was bound to favor particularistic interests to the detriment of the 
collective good. There was no place, in that context, for the invisible hand of a “free market”. 
The “Hand” existed but it was the highly visible one of the Prince or the polity.  
 
German Historicism 
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The historical school of economic thought was also involved in a profound and bitter, 
discussion with liberalism. Historicism had its roots in Germany and was highly dominant in 
that country during the 19th century. German Historicists rejected the idea of natural economic 
laws and of universal theoretical systems (Shionoya 2001). They argued, instead, that 
economic “laws” were contingent upon historical, social and institutional conditions. This was 
a common theme but there were variations, in particular between a descriptive and a 
normative form of historicism. 
 
Descriptive historicism pointed to the embeddedness of economic arrangements, underscoring 
the need for historically and sociologically grounded empirical economics (Iggers 1968). 
From that perspective, market economies had no prime of place. They should be 
contextualized and efficiency could not be presumed. Normative historicism went further. It 
connected economic trajectories with national identities – states being symbolic carriers. The 
consequence was militant support for the status quo that reflected the essence of a nation. 
This implied also a preoccupation for nation building through state-led economic policy that 
was reminiscent of mercantilism. Concretely, this meant that in Germany normative 
historicism found legitimate, towards the end of the 19th century, a combination of organized 
capitalism and strong state intervention. Such a combination, emerging together with German 
unification, marked as it were the culmination of the German “spirit”. Progress was away 
from chaos, towards order; away from free or wild markets and towards organization and 
centralization.  
 
In retrospect, the fate of German historicism was closely linked to two developments. First, 
German historicism lost the methodenstreit – the methodological dispute that opposed it to 
Austrian liberals during the 1880s (Hodgson 2001). For the Austrian Carl Menger the prime 
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task of economic analysis was theory making and theoretical knowledge could not emerge 
from historical economics. Since then, this position has become uncontroversial in economics 
and the legitimacy of historicism was weakened in the process. A second development was 
the association of normative historicism with Prussian and later German nationalism. This 
association further contributed to marginalize historicism. 
 
Although there is no trace of historicism in mainstream economics, it has not disappeared 
from the ecology of ideas. Historicism has influenced economic history (Koot 1987). It was 
also absorbed by early American institutionalists, such as Thorstein Veblen or Richard Ely, 
and is having an impact through that lineage on heterodox economics (Yonay 1998). It is 
probably most alive, though, in economic sociology, reflecting a Weberian heritage (Guillèn 
2002). Contemporary economic sociologists have revived the descriptive project of the 
German historical school. They put markets in perspective, showing both the embeddedness 
of economic arrangements and the contextual efficiency of alternatives to markets (Whitley 
1999; Hall and Soskice 2001; Fligstein 2001). Through the contemporary vitality of economic 
sociology, historicism is still indirectly present in the debate around neoliberalism. 
 
 
Economic Liberalism – The Sleeping Beauty  
 
The first 60 to 70 years in the twentieth century were difficult for economic liberalism. The 
idea that economic action should take place in free markets and that state intervention should 
remain limited did not convince during that period. The belief in free trade as a source of 
prosperity did not fare better. In Europe, the United States and elsewhere, those years were 
characterized by the triumph of interventionism. The latter could take different forms.  
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Socialized property and centralized planning imposed themselves in the Soviet Union and, 
after 1945, in many other countries under Soviet influence. The Great Depression and its 
aftermaths brought Keynesianism on the policy making scene in many capitalist countries. 
State intervention and regulation of markets became staple fare. The trend was only 
reinforced with the turn to war economies. In capitalist countries where Keynesianism was 
not the inspiration, the influence of Nazism or authoritarian ideologies was being felt. Here 
again, this meant a quasi-disappearance of market mechanisms, strong state intervention and a 
surge in protectionism. In parallel to this triumph of state intervention, cartelization had been 
progressing in most economies, championed by private actors themselves. Free markets and 
competition were associated with chaos and disruption, while cartelized markets held the 
promise of orderly and rational economic development. The consequence was a triumph of 
organized capitalism, at least until 1945, that extended across national borders with the 
multiplication of international cartels (Djelic and Kleiner this volume)..  
 
During those years, the prophets of free markets had not disappeared but they were a minority 
with scant influence on policy making. Liberalism went “underground” and only a few 
scientific centers kept the flame burning. Three of those centers emerge as particularly 
important. The Chicago School was making its first steps, grounding the foundations for the 
liberal Temple. The Austrian school was another important node. The small German ordo-
liberal school finally deserves to be mentioned, if only for the “miracle” of its survival in an 
environment decidedly not conducive to liberalism.  
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Building the liberal Temple – the early years at Chicago  
Created in 1892, the University of Chicago was originally financed by John D. Rockefeller, 
the “Titan” of the American oil industry (Chernow 1998). The first head of the Economics 
Department at Chicago was J. Lawrence Laughlin. Laughlin was a mixture of neo-classical 
theorist and aggressive big business apologist – the type that seemed to “confirm the 
suspicion of those who regarded the University of Chicago as a tool of business interests” 
(Coats 1963).  
 
The liberalism championed by Laughlin differed in important ways from Smithian or 
Manchester-type liberalism. His apology of the market was reconciled with the corporate and 
oligopolistic revolution that transformed American capitalism (Sklar 1988; Bornemann 1940). 
This reconciliation between markets and “bigness” has remained to this day a trademark of 
the so-called Chicago School of economics (Miller 1962; Nelson 2001).  
 
The Chicago School crystallized during the 1930s around the key figure of Franck Knight 
(Nelson 2001). The group that emerged then would make the Chicago School famous – Jacob 
Viner, Henry Simons, Aaron Director, Allen Wallis, Milton Friedman, Rose Director 
Friedman and George Stigler (Reder 1982). Franck Knight championed free markets on moral 
grounds, as the best arrangements to ensure the preservation of individual freedom. Increased 
efficiency and utility maximization were positive collaterals, not ends in themselves (Nelson 
2001).  
 
Keeping the flame alive – The Austrian front and German mavericks 
The methodenstreit had revealed the existence of what German Historicists disparagingly 
called an “Austrian School”. Inspired by libertarian philosophy, Austrian economists have 
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been staunch proponents of free markets, free trade and laissez faire (Cubeddu 1993). They 
have focused on the dynamics of capitalism, with the entrepreneur as core figure. Austrians 
are “Jeffersonians”, hailing a market with multiple nodes/ free individuals / entrepreneurs 
(Mayer 1994). The school has specificities that keep it at a distance from mainstream 
economics – in particular a reluctance to join the “marginal” or mathematical revolution as 
pioneered by Marshall, Walras and the Cambridge School (Schumpeter 1983: III, cha.v).  
 
Carl Menger, who fought the methodenstreit, was an important early figure. The most famous 
names, though, have been Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek. Austrian liberals were 
the first to argue seriously against Marxian economic thought, already in the 1880s. Von 
Mises’ publications were a landmark in that struggle and explain in part the association of 
Austrian economics with staunch anti-communism (Mises 1935).  
 
Before 1914, economists from the Austrian school enjoyed significant prestige and clout in 
Vienna. There were strong intellectual connections between that group and foreign 
colleagues, in particular Frank Knight in Chicago. However, during the interwar period, the 
Austrian School was increasingly marginalized. By the 1930s, with the rise of Nazism in the 
background, the school literally exploded. Hayeck left for the London School of Economics 
and in 1950 for the University of Chicago (Dostaler and Ethier 1989). Von Mises went first to 
Geneva and in 1940 to New York city. Most other members left Vienna to go to the United 
States. Migration on such a scale fostered the emergence of an “American generation of 
Austrian economists” (Vaughn 1994). This generation would play a significant role in the 
liberal revival (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). 
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In Germany, liberalism was a maverick ideology until the end of World War II at least. In 
hostile conditions, a few Germans championed notions of free market, putting their career at 
stake in the process. The Freiburg or “Ordo-liberal” school was blaming collectivism, 
cartelization, state intervention and protectionism for the dire straits of the economy but also 
for the rise of Nazism. In contrast to the zeitgeist, the ordo-liberal school was in favor of 
competition, not least as a necessary condition for political democracy (Nicholls 1984; 
Peacock and Willgerodt 1989).  
 
In 1936, the ordo-liberal school published a manifesto – “Our Task”. The competitive 
economy they envisioned had neoclassical features – with multiple units, each one more or 
less corresponding to a private household. However, ordo-liberals did not believe in 
competition as self-maintaining equilibrium – non intervention in Germany had only brought 
about collusion. Markets and competitive conditions should be created and protected through 
legal frameworks (Peacock and Willgerodt 1989: cha.2).  
 
Throughout the Nazi period, the Freiburg school was a hub of intellectual resistance. At the 
end of World War II, it was neither well known nor well-connected (Nicholls 1984). Things 
changed with the occupation of Germany and the Freiburg school became an important actor 
then of the transformation of German capitalism (Nicholls 1984; Berghahn 1986; Djelic 
1998).  
 
 
Towards a Liberal Revival  
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Throughout the first part of the twentieth century, liberalism remained a “dormant beauty”, 
with scant influence in Europe or the United States. After World War II, there were important 
steps towards a liberal revival. The creation of the Mont Pélerin Society was a marker – 
opening the way to the proliferation of liberal think-tanks everywhere in the world. By the 
late 1970s, the liberal inspiration was back and strong on the intellectual scene. The 1980s 
created the political windows of opportunity that made it possible for liberalism to impose 
itself in policy making circles, initially in Chile, the United States and Great Britain.  
 
Hayeck and the Mont Pélerin Society – Inventing the Think-Tank 
In 1944, Friedrich von Hayek published The Road to Serfdom, where he argued that state 
interventionism led, inexorably, to tyranny. Nazism was being defeated; nevertheless the 
zeitgeist was still conducive to interventionism. With a view to reviving the liberal inspiration, 
Hayek had the idea of bringing together like-minded individuals. The meeting took place in 
April 1947, at Mont Pélerin, in Switzerland. The 39 participants shared a commitment to free 
markets and limited government albeit with varied understandings of what those meant. 
Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Aaron Director, Ludwig von Mises, Karl Popper or 
Wilhelm Röpke were all present. 
 
At the end of the meeting, the group decided to institutionalize itself in the form of the Mont 
Pélerin Society (MPS). Registered as a non-profit corporation in Illinois, the Society was 
dedicated to reviving, sustaining and spreading liberalism. Until 1967, Hayek was its 
President. The Mont Pélerin Society remains a virtual organization, with no headquarters, and 
recruits through cooptation. The Society has no official publications and exists intellectually 
through the contributions of its members. Its website is not very informative – and in 
particular the list of current members cannot be accessed. In spite (or because) of this discrete 
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touch, the MPS has been an important mechanism of the liberal revival (Mendes 2003). 
Membership has expanded, both in absolute numbers and in geographical reach. In 1947, 39 
members came from 10 different countries; there are today around 500 members coming from 
40 different countries. To this day, the MPS claims merely an advocacy role, proposing that 
“its sole objective is to facilitate an exchange of ideas between like-minded scholars in the 
hope of strengthening the principles and practice of a free society” (www.mps.org).  
 
A measure of the intellectual clout achieved by the MPS is the number of Nobel prize winners 
amongst its members. Hayek received the Nobel Prize in 1974. He was followed by Milton 
Friedman (1976), George Stigler (1982), James Buchanan (1986), Maurice Allais (1988), 
Ronald Coase (1991), Gary Becker (1992) and Vernon Smith (2002).  
 
The MPS was a pioneer. It had followers and liberal think-tanks have flourished since the 
1970s in the United States and elsewhere in the world (Stefancic and Delgado 1998; Mendes 
2003; Krastev 2000). We only give some examples here. The Heritage Foundation (1973) or 
the Acton Institute (1990) brought together the liberal and Christian traditions 
(www.heritage.org, www.acton.org). The Ludwig von Mises Institute was created in 1982 and 
it has become an important seat of libertarianism (www.mises.org). The general trend has 
been towards an increasing presence of private and corporate interests – as evidenced for 
example by the Bertelsmann Foundation in Germany, the Cato Institute or the American 
Enterprise Institute in the US (www.stiftung.bertelsmann.de, www.cato.org, www.aei.org).  
 
Chicago – The New Generations 
In parallel to the multiplication of liberal think-tanks, the Chicago School was reaching 
maturity. The new generation had appropriated the philosophical insights of their teachers, in 
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particular Frank Knight. There were two features, however, that set that generation apart. 
First, it jumped on the bandwagon of the “marginal” or mathematical revolution in economics 
and contributed to its acceleration (Reder 1982). Second, with Milton Friedman as its main 
spokesman, this generation re-affirmed the public and polemical role of the economist, 
originally explored by Laughlin.  
 
By the early 1960s, the Chicago School in economics had acquired its unique features 
(Bronfenbrenner 1962). First, one finds an unconditional advocacy of the market mechanism. 
The Chicago economist “differs in this advocacy from many economists on his dogmatism 
and in assuming that the actual market functions like the ideal one” (Miller 1962: 66). Second, 
one finds a principled rejection of regulation and state intervention that implies acceptation of 
the evolutionary dynamics of market competition. This has meant, in particular, that the 
Chicago School has accepted “bigness”. The fear of concentrated wealth, present in the work 
of Adam Smith, has had little weight in Chicago, much less in any case than the fear of 
government. Gary Becker summed it well: “It may be preferable not to regulate economic 
monopolies and to suffer their bad effects, rather than to regulate them and suffer the effects 
of political imperfection” (Becker 1958: 109).  
 
Third, one finds a Panglossian vision of the world. The market mechanism leads to greater 
efficiency, collective prosperity and individual freedom (Friedman and Friedman 1979, xv, 
28: 129). Fourth, provided the state does not meddle, the market mechanism should be self-
sustaining (Reder 1982). Fifth, the associated conception of human nature is that of neo-
classical economics – human beings are out to maximize utility. The Chicago School has 
systematically explored that path by expanding the boundaries of economics, explaining theft, 
discrimination, marriage, fertility, child rearing (Becker 1971, 1991), legal issues (Posner 
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1972) or the functioning of religious institutions (Ekelund et al. 1996) through the prism of 
utility maximization.  
 
Six, and finally, the contemporary Chicago School has reconciled science and politics. The 
postwar generation contributed to the scientific and mathematical turn in economics while 
being actively involved in policy making and political discussions. As we show below, the 
move to politics was initially partly accidental. Soon, though, the most vocal Chicago 
economists – in particular Friedman – found out that there was a “market” for their ideas and 
turned themselves into missionaries of market principles. Their proposals for reform  
 
involved either increased use of the price system, substitution of private for public 
production (eg. in health, education), replacement of legal compulsion by voluntary – 
financially induced – private cooperation or a mixture of all three (Reder 1982: 25). 
 
Political Windows of Opportunity 
During the 1970s, the liberal agenda moved progressively from marginality to centre stage. 
The process reflected in part chance and opportunities and in part the entrepreneurial flair of a 
few individuals who managed to identify those opportunities and ride on the wave.  
 
In the 1970s, oil shocks created major disruptions that were reinterpreted as revealing 
structural fragilities. A striking puzzle was the combination of economic depression and 
significant inflation. “Stagflation”, as the phenomenon was called, was in contradiction with 
Keynesian economics (Friedman 1968). The Keynesian stop-and-go machine appeared to be 
jammed. The “sleeping beauty” was out there, ready to be awaken through the search for 
alternative tool-kits. Inspired by the liberal intellectual revival, economists and policy makers 
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came to blame excessive regulation and government intervention for structural rigidities. The 
most astounding expression of that was proposed by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
James Callaghan, a former trade unionist. In 1976, Callaghan pronounced Keynesianism dead 
and state intervention a failure.3
The term “supply-side economics” was coined in the 1970s to refer to the liberal policy 
package that targeted stagflation. Supply-side economics were inspired by Austrian 
economics and libertarian philosophy and in close intellectual affinity with Chicago-style 
monetarism and liberalism (Leeson 1998). A starting proposition was that economic growth 
depends upon market efficiency and the smooth allocation of resources for production. The 
policy recommendation was to remove impediments to free markets and to reduce in 
particular state involvement. This translated into privatization, deregulation, a scaling back of 
welfare benefits and tax cuts. Supply-side economics also recommended free trade as a means 
to “healthy” competition. Monetarism, closely associated from the start with supply-side 
 
 
We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession and increase 
employment by cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I tell you in all 
honesty that that option no longer exists and that in so far as it ever did exist it worked 
on each occasion since the war by injecting bigger doses of inflation into the economy, 
followed by a higher level of unemployment (quoted in Callaghan 1987). 
 
Monetarism and supply-side economics were on their way, pointing to markets and the price 
mechanism as an alternative path to managing the economy.  
 
                                                 
3 This part of Callaghan’s speech was drafted by Peter Jay, his son in law, who was strongly influenced then by 
the work of Milton Friedman (Keegan 1984:91).  
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economics, had the curbing of inflation as key objective. The argument was that free market 
economies were inherently stable in the absence of major fluctuations in money supply and 
hence in the absence of government meddling into monetary issues. Central banks, as a 
consequence, should be strong and independent (see Marcussen this volume).  
 
The first experiment in supply-side economics took place in Chile. In 1973, a military coup 
backed by the CIA put an end to Salvador Allende’s project of reaching socialism through 
reformist means. The military dictatorship turned instead to free market economics under 
guidance of the “Chicago Boys”. Those were Chilean economists with a PhD from the 
University of Chicago, who had benefited in the 1950s from a US-government program 
designed to counter a leftist bias in Chilean economics (Valdès 1995). The “Chicago Boys” 
privatized public industries and reversed the expropriation of the Allende years. They reduced 
trade barriers and made labor legislation more favorable to business interests. Social security 
was privatized and monetary policies followed Friedman’s orthodoxy (Foxley 1983; 
Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002: 13) 
 
Great Britain and the United States were two other early pioneers, starting already in the 
1970s, ironically under Labour and Democrat governments. We have described Callaghan’s 
change of heart. In the United States, deregulation on a big scale started under President 
Carter, a southern Democrat. In 1979, Carter put the Federal Reserve Board in the hands of 
the Monetarist Paul Volcker, with the mission to tame inflation. The reorientation widened in 
scale and scope once Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan took over. Both had strongly 
been influenced by liberal intellectuals and think tanks. Milton Friedman had been a close 
advisor to Ronald Reagan already in 1973, when Reagan was Governor of California (Leeson, 
1998: 45). The British Centre for Policy Studies, set up in 1974 with Thatcher as President, 
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was the channel through which monetarism and supply-side economics found their way to 
Thatcher’s political platform (Keegan 1984: 46-7, 81-2). In Britain, the influence of supply-
side economics translated into the “systematic implementation of an agenda of deflation, 
privatization, deregulation and downsizing of the public sector” and in an attempt at 
dismantling the welfare state (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002: 556). In the United 
States, deregulation was implemented on a large-scale and the public and welfare sectors were 
pulled towards market logics. Deflation and tax cuts triumphed. 
 
 
Towards Global Diffusion of Marketization  
 
The liberal revival had great consequences for the economic, social and political landscapes 
of pioneer countries like Chile, Great Britain or the United States. But its impact soon became 
felt more broadly. The Thatcher and Reagan revolutions opened the floodgates of liberalism. 
They represented focal points around which logics of transnational diffusion articulated.  
 
Diffusion and its Context 
The context of diffusion was characterized by five distinctive developments. First, the 
economic crisis of the 1970s had a nearly global impact, pointing everywhere to the limits of 
Keynesian recipes. Second, it increased the dependence of many countries on international 
financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank 
(WB). Third, the fall of the Berlin Wall seemed to imply a victory of capitalism and 
liberalism over communism and its interventionist legacies and translated for former 
communist countries into dependence on international financial institutions, the United States 
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and rich Western countries. The terrain was conducive then to an ideological U-turn in those 
countries – towards the “all-market” mantra and radical forms of political and/or cultural 
liberalism.  
 
Fourth, the United States was rising in parallel to hegemony power – if not “Empire”. Since 
1945, diffusion flows have been highly skewed. Practices, ideas and institutional rules of the 
game have gone predominantly from the United States towards the rest of the (Western) 
world (Djelic 1998; Zeitlin and Herrigel 2000). This tendency has not abated quite to the 
contrary.. Fifth, as an epistemic community (Haas 1992) but also as policy makers, 
economists have gained in presence, clout and strength worldwide. The progress of this group 
has combined with global homogenization of the profession (Kogut and Macpherson 2003). 
Since there as elsewhere American hegemony was strongly felt, the Chicago turn of American 
economics, once in progress, has spread fast and wide.  
 
Carriers and Channels of Diffusion 
The global diffusion of marketization has had multiple dimensions. We argue that, out of this 
diversity, it is possible to identify four categories of carriers or transmission channels.4
                                                 
4 Our categorization is compatible with that of Scott although slightly different (2003). Scott identifies four 
broad classes of “carriers” or “vehicles” – symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, artifacts (Scott 
2003:882). 
 First, 
we find organizational carriers broadly understood. Second, we find routines and 
institutionalized practices, often associated with organizational carriers. Third, we identify 
relational or social networks as important transmission channels. Fourth, we point to the role 
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of normative and symbolic systems as carriers in themselves. Naturally, those are ideal types 
and in most empirical situations, interplay is likely.  
 
Within the broad category of organizational carriers, we make a difference between classical 
organizations and network or meta- organizations (see Arhne and Brunsson this volume). The 
IMF, the WB or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are 
amongst those classical organizations that have played a significant part in the global spread 
of marketization. The IMF and the WB carry around the “Washington Consensus” – another 
label for what we call marketization (Stiglitz 2002). In parallel, private firms and service 
providers with a multinational reach are also important carriers. Anglo-saxon firms were 
pioneers; today most organizations with a global ambition share at least parts of the 
marketization discourse and agenda. 
 
The spread of marketization also owes a lot to organized spaces with unclear boundaries. The 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Development (OECD), the 
European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European 
Round-Table of Industrialists are all variants of network and meta-organizations. They all 
play a part in the global move towards market logics. Their impact plays itself out in part at 
the level of normative frames – and hence may be less perceptible but probably more 
enduring in the longer term than the coercive pressure of the IMF or of institutional investors. 
 
Routines and practices constitute a second category of carriers. Although often associated 
with organized spaces, routines and practices can be influential in themselves in particular 
when diffusing beyond their context of origin. The setting-up of independent public agencies, 
for example, has ideological and structural implications that carry forward the marketization 
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trend (Gilardi 2005). As another example, routines associated with accreditation and rankings 
in higher education increase competitive and market pressures in that field (see Hedmo et al. 
this volume). 
 
Relational or social networks represent a third category of. carriers. There is naturally a 
danger to overemphasize the importance of social networks, as is often done in micro-studies 
of diffusion (Strang and Meyer 1993). But there is also a risk to forget the role that social and 
relational networks play in transnational and macro processes of diffusion (Djelic 2004). The 
transnational diffusion of marketization has historically been facilitated, we argue, by the 
articulation of different types of relational networks. In particular, transnational bridging 
networks – such as the Mont Pélerin Society – need to connect with institutionalized and 
powerful local networks (Djelic 2004). This ensures that ideas and practices get, first, 
transferred across borders and, second, lastingly appropriated including through translation 
(Czarniawska and Sevón 1996).  
 
Normative and symbolic systems, finally, constitute a fourth category of carriers. Ideological 
frames or institutionalized “myths” (Meyer and Rowan 1977) are powerful because they can 
shape behaviors and interactions a priori. When those frames are inscribed in socialization 
systems, they can become invisible to embedded actors.. Twenty years ago, the concept 
“maximizing shareholder value” did not exist in most European countries. Today, it is a 
revealed truth, an unquestioned logic in many business and business school contexts across 
Europe. The spread of the concept and its associated normative scheme justifies in turn the 
implementation of routines and practices that stabilize it further. There is a self-reinforcing 
loop there. Ideas flow and as such they are carriers and not only carried. Categories and 
concepts such as “competition”, “maximizing shareholder value”, “transparency”, “New 
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Public Management”, “markets”, “privatization” flow across the world – carrying with them 
organizational, practical and behavioral implications that reinforce the marketization trend. 
However, diffusion also implies reception and reception calls for local appropriation, 
contextual decoding and “indigenization” (Scott 2003: 884). As they flow, ideas and 
normative categories are also “edited” (Sahlin-Andersson 1996), translated and hybridized 
(Czarniawska and Sevon 1996; Djelic 1998). The local decoding process – and its 
organizational and relational filters– should also be scrutinized.  
 
Epistemic communities (Haas 1992) and professions are powerful combinations of our last 
two categories. They are anonymous social networks bound together through shared 
normative and symbolic systems. Epistemic communities and professions have been 
instrumental for the global spread of marketization and as such deserve to be singled out here.  
 
Mechanisms and Logics of Diffusion 
Those carriers and transmission channels function according to different types of logics. We 
identify three categories of logics that resonate loosely with the categorization of diffusion 
channels. Here again, in most situations of diffusion, interplay is likely. This categorization is 
an alternative to the classical typology of diffusion mechanisms (coercive, mimetic, 
normative) proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983).  
 
We point first to political logics. By that we mean logics reflecting power asymmetries and 
dependence. Political logics can translate into coercive pressures but also into voluntary 
imitation of what appears more “efficient”, more “modern”, more “rational” or more 
“scientific” (see Boli; Drori and Meyer this volume). The influence of financial institutions 
such as the IMF or the WB provides a good illustration of political logics. Those institutions 
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work through mechanisms of “conditionality” – conditioning credit lines upon the 
implementation of policies and reforms. During the last two decades, dependent countries 
have been coerced in this manner towards the adoption of neoliberal reform packages (Stiglitz 
2002). The influence of the European Union on candidate or potentially candidate countries is 
another good illustration. Integration is strictly conditioned upon a package of structural 
adjustments and reforms – many of which stimulate the progress of marketization in those 
countries. For potential candidates, with no definite time horizon, pressure may be more 
indirect and self-inflicted through voluntary imitation.  
 
A second category of diffusion logics are those associated with processes of social interaction. 
By social interaction, we mean various forms of direct interface and exchanges that often take 
place within and across social networks. Social interaction logics played a part in the 
constitution and spread of neoliberal think-tanks but also in the appropriation of the neoliberal 
agenda by British and American governments for example. When we consider the 
transnational diffusion of ideas, we argue that social interactions should be at the same time 
wide and deep (Djelic 2004). Global epistemic communities or advocacy networks are an 
interesting illustration of that. They combine transnational peer interaction with national or 
local strategies of influence towards key institutional and organizational nodes (Marcussen; 
McNichol; Djelic and Kleiner this volume).  
 
Finally, structuration and socialization processes point to a third category of diffusion logics. 
By structuration, we refer to a process by which the rules of the game are set and constituted 
to reflect a particular ideology and associated practices. Those framing schemes themselves 
can diffuse. They may then have an impact on practices, behaviors, interactions and shared 
beliefs through percolation and progressive socialization. Structuration logics can combine 
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with political and/or social integration logics. Structuration pressures will be all the more 
powerful that framing schemes become deeply institutionalized and possibly invisible for 
socialized actors. The progressive accession of the Chicago School to dominant position in 
the economics profession is a good example. Early steps in that direction revealed political 
and social interaction logics. Today, the influence is largely explained by the structuration 
power that tradition has achieved. The Chicago School agenda shapes to a great extent the 
rules of the game in the economics profession – in training institutions, publication outlets and 
academic networks.  
 
 
Conclusions: The Global Mantra of Marketization and its Limits  
 
Since the early 1980s, the spread of marketization has concretely meant deep transformations 
with economic, social and political dimensions. Market-oriented macro-economic policies – 
privatization, deregulation and liberalization – have spread rapidly (Ikenberry 1990; Eising 
2002; Henisz et al. 2004). Kogut and Macpherson (2003) document such rapid diffusion in 
the case of privatization. Pioneer experiments were those of Chile under Pinochet and Great 
Britain under Thatcher. The real explosion, though, happened in the late 1980s and in the 
1990s – in spite of mixed evidence by then on the merits of the British program (Vickers and 
Yarrow 1988). Trade liberalization also progressed during that period while the global spread 
of monetarism meant the diffusion of the ideology of central bank independence and 
associated institutional transformations (see Marcussen this volume). Marketization has also 
translated into financial liberalization – with a global structuration of the financial field (Van 
Zandt 1991; Ventresca et al. 2003) and increasing isomorphism of financial institutions, 
organizations, practices and discourses across the world (Simmons 2001; Kleiner 2003). The 
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same happened with the idea of competition. The fight for competitive markets has become a 
nearly global one – in principles and structures if not always in practice (Djelic and Kleiner 
this volume).  
 
Marketization has also implied a transformed approach to the role of states and to regulation. 
There are essentially four trends here. First; states increasingly delegate some of their rule-
making and rule-monitoring power to independent regulatory agencies (Gilardi 2005). 
Second, regulatory philosophy is increasingly moving towards structured self-regulation. 
Regulatory areas are “privatized”, turned into “markets” where many different actors interact 
and negotiate to reach a point of equilibrium expected to be efficient (see Hedmo et al.; 
Engels; McNichol this volume). In parallel, “control” is replaced by “audit” (Power 1997). 
The difference is subtle but significant – political fiat is displaced by “independent technical 
or scientific expertise” (see Drori and Meyer this volume) and monitoring authority is in part 
privatized. Third, states and administrations across the world are going through the “New 
Public Management” revolution (Hood 1995; Christensen and Laegreid 2001). This 
essentially amounts to a “managerialization” of state bureaucracies – with greater 
transparency, a preoccupation for efficiency and “customer” orientation, the generalization of 
competition and market mechanisms within and across administrative units. Fourth, the idea 
has made its way that the state could – and should – disengage from certain social and welfare 
activities. Private pension schemes have emerged as a consequence (Weyland 2003) and the 
health and education sectors are having to deal with competition and market pressures (see 
Ramirez this volume).  
 
The progress of marketization can also be measured through its impact on firms and forms of 
governance. During the 1990s, “outsourcing” and a focus on “core competencies” have 
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become all the rage. Both trends reflect the belief that markets allocate resources and orient 
strategic development more efficiently than managers or bureaucracies. Everywhere, the 
1990s have been marked by the expansion of stock markets and by increasing numbers of 
listed firms. This has in effect put financial markets at the core of many industries – with an 
influence on strategic and governance choices (Tainio et al. 2003).  
 
This progress of marketization has been associated and in close reinforcing interaction with 
the increasing presence, power and expansion of cultural liberalism (Meyer and Jepperson 
2000). Cultural liberalism places the individual at the centre – with a surprising and 
worldwide expansion of standardized ideas about individual rights, powers and competences 
(see e.g. Drori and Meyer this volume). This progress of the “individual” goes well beyond 
the human person. Animals themselves are increasingly treated as “individuals”. In our liberal 
marketized societies, corporations also are “individuals” in that sense, and by extension state 
agencies too. 
 
Although the global progress of marketization is undeniable, there are limits to its reach. 
Limits stem from political and ideological resistance – as the strength of the anti-globalization 
movement illustrates. Limits stem also from local translation, editing and hybridization that 
mitigate the progress of marketization (Czarniawska and Sévon 1996; Sahlin-Andersson 
1996; Djelic 1998). While market logics have advanced in all Western European countries, 
national welfare schemes have not, for example, been dismantled to the extent one would 
expect (Deacon 2005). Limits are also visible in processes of “decoupling” – the 
marketization revolution does not always go down from discourse to implementation. One 
naturally has to add a geographic if not cultural dimension to that mapping of limits. Certain 
regions, like subsaharian Africa, are on the margins of the marketization revolution. Other 
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parts of the world, coinciding more or less with George W. Bush’s definition of “rogue 
states”, resist and reject, politically and culturally, the progress of marketization. Finally, 
building upon the story we have told here, one could speculate about another limit to the 
progress of marketization. Crisis and dissatisfaction with economic performance could 
combine with and stimulate the (re)emergence of “sleeping beauties” – sets of ideas and 
associated policies that could have been dormant for a long while without fully disappearing. 
History tells us that this type of ideological long waves is not impossible.  
 
